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social	 programs,	 policymakers	 and	 program	 managers	
increasingly	ask	for	evidence	of	effectiveness	based	on	studies	
that	 rely	 on	 solid	 methodology,	 providing	 credible	 scientific	
evidence.	 The	 basic	 claim	 for	 the	 “social	 experiment”—that	
the	 “coin	 flip”	 of	 randomization	 creates	 two	 statistically	
equivalent	 groups	 that	 do	 not	 diverge	 except	 through	 an	
intervention’s	 effects—makes	 resulting	 estimates	 unbiased.	
Despite	 the	 transparency	 and	 conceptual	 strength	 of	 the	
experimental	 strategy	 for	 revealing	 the	 causal	 connection	
between	an	intervention	and	the	outcomes	of	its	participants,	












Research	 Design:	 The	 research	 uses	 the	 authors’	 experience	
designing	 and	 conducting	 dozens	 of	 social	 experiments	 to	
examine	 the	 basis	 for	 and	 soundness	 of	 each	 concern.	 	 It		
provides	 examples	 from	 the	 scholarly	 literature	 and	


















When deciding how to allocate limited taxpayer or 
donor funds for social programs, policymakers and 
program managers increasingly ask for evidence of 
effectiveness based on studies that do not raise 
quibbles over methodology. They want to assess 
the extent to which programs have their intended 
effects based on research that all sides of the policy 
debate can agree provides credible scientific 
evidence. If it is true, as Trochim notes, that “Only 
a few programs should survive in the long run” 
(2009, 28), then it is our contention that policy 
choices to terminate, continue, or expand social 
programs should be based on research meeting 
high standards of evidence. For government and 
foundation policymakers, strong causal inference 
showing that a public sector or philanthropic 
intervention has a favorable impact provides 
justification for continued funding or expansion. 
Conversely, unequivocal evidence of 
ineffectiveness is often needed to justify 
termination of an existing public program with 
strong political or bureaucratic constituency but 
that, with rigorous testing, is found to be 
producing little or no social benefit. After defining 
social experiments as a source for credible 
scientific evidence and discussing briefly their 
alternatives, this article discusses common 
concerns about experiments in theory and in 
practice.  It concludes that opportunities exist for 
extending social experiments to wider applications 
in appraising the effectiveness of government and 




We begin by describing the experimental 
methodology for measuring social program 
impacts to ensure it is understood, as a starting 
point for later addressing potential objections to 
the methodology that are the focus of the article. 
Most people unfamiliar with the concept of 
randomized social experiments find experience 
from the medical field a useful introduction. In 
order to test whether a new drug is effective in its 
claims, pharmaceutical companies undertake 
“randomized control trials” (RCTs). These trials 
randomly assign some people to—for example—
receive a new drug while others receive a placebo, 
an inert dose (or the common standard of care). By 
following subjects’ subsequent outcomes, 
researchers can determine not only the extent to 
which the drug made a difference (in reducing 
headaches or ulcers or cancer), but also the extent 
to which side-effects occur. Because the two 
groups are randomly assigned to their medical 
treatment experience, the only difference between 
the two later on is the medication. 
 Substitute “public policy,” “social program,” or 
“intervention” of some sort for “drug” and the 
same approach applies in testing the effectiveness 
of public and non-profit efforts to ameliorate 
social and economic ills. Social experiments 
deliberately exclude from participation some of the 
people or organizations an intervention would 
ordinarily serve in order to create a control group 
that represents the world without that 
intervention. Excluded cases are selected from 
would-be participants purely by chance, through a 
lottery-like process that randomly divides the 
population into two groups: a “treatment group” 
assigned to receive the program or policy that 
defines the intervention and a “control group” 
excluded from the program or policy for research 
purposes.  
 When truly selected at random from the 
potential participant pool and kept out of the 
intervention, the members of an experimental 
control group will meet three critical conditions 
for accurately representing the world without the 
policy/program. First, except by chance, they are 
collectively the same kind of people or 
organizations as the people or organizations in the 
treatment group. Second, they are not subject to 
the intervention, and therefore experience no 
effects from it. Third, they otherwise operate in 
entirely the same environment—policy, economic, 
and social—as the program participants in the 
treatment group, and therefore represent a true 
“counterfactual” for what would have happened to 
participants in the absence of the intervention. 
 In a successfully implemented experiment, the 
second condition here assures that the control 
group differs from the treatment group on the 
factor of interest—the intervention whose impact 
we wish to measure—while the other two 
conditions assure that nothing else between the 
two groups differs. In large samples, with many 
cases allocated to the treatment or control groups 
on a purely random basis, any chance differences 
in preexisting characteristics (both measured and 
unmeasured) between the two groups tend to 
disappear, and it becomes very unlikely that 
observed differences in later outcomes between 
the two groups are caused by anything other than 
the effects of the program or policy under study.  
 Reliably representing the world without the 
intervention is crucial to determining whether 
government and philanthropic social programs 
make a difference. Experiments that use random 
assignment—if successfully implemented and 
effective at meeting the challenges discussed later 
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in this article—provide a solid counterfactual as 
represented in the outcomes observed for the 
control group. This counterfactual allows 
elimination of the so-called “threats to internal 
validity”—i.e., plausible rival explanations for why 
change might occur over time or why differences 
could arise between participants and 
nonparticipating comparison groups used as 
counterfactuals but determined by natural 
processes rather than random exclusions (e.g., 
Campbell & Stanley, 1968; Cook & Campbell, 1979; 
Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002). The plausible 
rival explanations, in scientific lingo, include 
systematic selection into the intervention, 
maturation, regression-to-the-mean, history, 
testing, and instrumentation. The experimental 
design itself is structured to net out all of these 
influences when subtracting control group 
outcomes from treatment group outcomes to 
produce unbiased impact estimates.   
 This approach runs in contrast to other 
possible means for approximating a counterfactual 
in order to determine the contribution of a policy 
or intervention to changes in social outcomes. 
Other ways to produce a counterfactual include: 
 
• belief (theology, religious faith, folk 
wisdom); 
• practical experience; 
• extrapolation of prior conditions into the 
future (i.e., presume that no change from 
preconditions would occur without the 
policy or intervention); 
• measurement of outcomes for “non-
treated” cases that occur naturally in the 
world—cases presumed to be otherwise 
similar to treated cases; or 
• measurement of outcomes for “non-
treated” cases deliberately constructed by 
the researchers through an imposed 
mechanism or decision rule.  
 
 Among the possible mechanisms or decision 
rules that might be imposed by the researchers are 
the following: 
 
• a cut-point on a continuous scale above 
which the policy/intervention is applied 
(this supports a “regression discontinuity” 
design and impact analysis);  
• “profiling” potential intervention 
participants on their characteristics as the 
basis for sorting them into and out of the 
intervention (this supports a “propensity 
score matching” design and impact 
analysis); and 
• a random lottery, with treated cases 
picked by chance from a larger pool—
leaving the untreated members of the pool 
to serve as the counterfactual. 
 
 No one would say that the last of these 
options—using a randomized lottery to produce a 
social experiment—is everywhere and always the 
best way to identify counterfactual outcome levels 
and measure impacts.  Indeed, we recognize the 
longstanding and contentious debate surrounding 
evaluation methods suited to assessing the causal 
impacts of policies and programs. We also 
recognize the recent flurry of “design replication” 
studies (also called “within-study comparison 
designs”), in which results from non-
experimentally-designed evaluations are tested 
against experimentally-derived evidence. Although 
the earliest of social policy replication studies (e.g., 
Fraker & Maynard, 1987; LaLonde, 1986) reached 
pessimistic conclusions, as the field has evolved 
alternative, non-experimental methods have been 
shown in some cases to replicate the results from 
their matched experiments in terms of policy 
implications or, even more reassuringly, in the 
magnitude of their impact estimates (e.g., Cook, 
Shadish & Wong, 2008; Cook, Steiner, & Pohl, 
2008; Pohl et al., 2009, St. Clair, Cook & Hallberg, 
2014; Shadish, 2011). We laud those research 
efforts but note that until the body of evidence 
becomes decisive on which circumstances permit 
specific non-experimental designs to be used with 
confidence to generate solid causal evidence of 
policy effects in specific circumstances, 
experiments will continue to play an important 
role within the field of evaluation. 
 Implementing a classically-designed 
experiment is one method for producing a valid 
counterfactual, but doing so takes more than a 
random number generator: enforcing the embargo 
on program participation among control group 
members can be especially challenging and often 
falls short of universal compliance. This, and the 
failure to obtain follow-up outcome data for all 
randomly assigned cases (treatment and control), 
are important challenges to randomized 
experiments as the paradigm for valid causal 
inferences. With this as introduction, we now turn 
to a systematic discussion of some other major 




Despite the transparency and conceptual strength 
of the experimental design in establishing a causal 
link between intervention and outcome, 
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experiments are often questioned on a variety of 
grounds (e.g., Greenberg & Barnow, 2014). Two of 
these critiques we have acknowledged as needing 
concerted attention in implementing and 
analyzing data from experiments: crossovers of 
control group cases into the intervention (see 
Angrist et al., 2006) and incomplete follow-up 
data (see Puma et al, 2009). Other concerns raised 
in the research and practice of large-scale impact 
evaluations apply to all kinds of evaluation 
designs, and we visit these briefly at the end of the 
paper. We focus the bulk of the article on 15 
concerns that are specific to experiments and, 
through our analysis and examples, find each one 
less of an impediment to the use of random 
assignment research methods for social policy 
evaluation than is widely believed.  
 We classify the examined concerns into four 
categories: ethical, scientific, feasibility, and 
financial. Across these domains, we argue that 
none of the concerns examined threatens the 
reliability or viability of experimental techniques 
for measuring the impacts of social interventions. 
As a result, we conclude that government agencies 
and foundation funders have the opportunity to 
use experimental methods to obtain transparent 
and compelling answers to important social policy 
impact questions in more instances than they may 
recognize. While other impact analysis methods 
may be appropriate in certain circumstances, not 
until two things happen would we recommend 
wide use of non-experimental impact analysis 
approaches: evaluators gain a better 
understanding of intervention participation 
selection processes in the complex systems in 
which social policies operate and a larger body of 
design replication studies inform the 
circumstances in which selected non-experimental 
designs give accurate findings.  
 Recognizing that experiments are not a 
panacea for all policy evaluation needs, we believe 
it is important that social experiments be 
conducted as widely as possible for the same 
reason that experiments are ubiquitous and 
invaluable in advancing our knowledge about 
chemistry, biology, medicine, agriculture, and 
industrial processes: to vary the one factor of 
paramount interest (in this case, a particular 
public policy or program) while holding all other 
factors equal. Policymakers and program 
administrators can then confidently use 
information about the consequences of the 
variable factor—the social intervention being 
tested—to decide on the intervention’s future use.  
 That said, experiments face a variety of 
challenges, leading us to three areas of inquiry: 
What are some major concerns or criticisms raised 
about social experiments? To what extent are 
those concerns valid? To what extent are these 
criticisms surmountable? The viewpoints 
expressed in our exploration of these questions—
including the identification of the specific concerns 
about social experiments brought up for 
discussion—reflect decades of collective experience 
designing and analyzing randomized and non-
randomized comparison group impact evaluations 
in a variety of program contexts (e.g., employment 
and training, education, housing, family and child 
assistance, public assistance, and food and 
nutrition policy). While some of the concerns are 
well-cited in existing scholarship, some of them 
are not, instead being identified from practical 
experience. As such, this is the first time some of 
these criticisms appear in the literature.  
 The discussion and analysis offered are 
intended to spur dialogue among policy evaluation 
researchers and funders and push the field 
forward (Bell, 2003). The primary audience is 
government and foundation funders who decide 
what type of evaluations to undertake. It is 
important that knowledge from the field, reflective 
of the latest, most complete experience of 
evaluators, reach those decision-makers. It is also 
important that practitioners of impact evaluation 
understand what can be accomplished with 
experimental evaluation designs so they can 
support funders in carrying out experiments when 
called for. 
 To serve both of the funder and practitioner 
audiences, we now review 15 concerns about 
randomized experiments and why we believe each 




Social experiments must answer the most 
fundamental challenge to their legitimacy—the 
contention that exclusion of some eligible and 
deserving individuals or organizations from a 
program’s services or a policy’s provisions for the 
sake of research is unethical. We address this 






An often-cited obstacle in planning an evaluation 
is concern about the ethics of randomizing access 
to government services (e.g., Boruch, 1997; 
Boruch, Victor & Cecil, 2000; Cook & Payne, 
2002; Gueron, 2002; Blustein, 2005). Are the 
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individuals who “lose the government lottery” and 
enter the control group disadvantaged unfairly or 
unethically? Some government programs are 
entitlements; denying access to them for the sake 
of research would be not only unethical but also 
illegal. Of course no evaluation should ever 
propose illegal treatment of potential research 
subjects. While the issue of ethics seems always to 
surface (and should), the fact remains that social 
experiments have been used often in the U.S. to 
evaluate the effectiveness of pilot and 
demonstration projects. Greenberg and Shroder 
(2004) catalogue over 200 of them, plus the 
Randomized Social Experiments eJournal’s early 
2015 count of at least 500 experiments since 2004. 
So at some level social experiments are ethically 
acceptable for the American polity; likewise, 
experimental evaluation designs are in wide use 
internationally, including in developing nations. 
Why might this be the case? The main ethical 
concern is that randomizing people to a control 
group denies them access to opportunities that 
they would otherwise have had and that could 
potentially benefit them. Three responses to this 
concern might be considered.  
 First, if—due to funding or administrative 
capacity constraints—a program has to limit the 
total number of people or organizations served 
relative to the number that seek services, it will in 
some way ration access. Random assignment, 
with control group members left out of the 
program’s services, is just one way to ration. 
Whether it is a better or worse way is the real 
question. We argue that giving all deserving 
applicants an equal chance at access, through a 
lottery, is the fairest, most ethical way to ration 
services that cannot be provided to all (e.g., 
Bickman & Reich, 2009; Orr, 1999). Surely it is 
more fair than allowing program staff to choose 
their favorite applicants based on personality, 
personal connections, or perceptions of who would 
benefit most from participating—or than serving 
those who happen to apply when service funding is 
flush rather than when it is scarce. It can be 
argued, then, that oversubscription to a program 
makes random assignment ethical.1  
																																																								
1 The case of researchers inducing more individuals or 
organizations to apply for services in order to create 
oversubscription is less clear. In that situation, some 
individuals or organizations that would have remained 
disinterested in or unaware of the program’s services 
decide they would like them. Those assigned to the 
treatment group cannot be harmed by stirring up 
interest, since the resulting “demand” for services is 
met. The corresponding control group members may be 
temporarily harmed by having their hopes—and 
 Second, if a program’s effectiveness has yet to 
be determined, being turned away from 
participation as part of a control group should 
not be presumed to be more detrimental than 
being admitted. For example, if job training on 
average does not lead to better employment 
outcomes—the very question an impact study 
seeks to answer, because the answer is not known, 
participating in it at best constitutes a neutral 
situation and may be disadvantageous, at least for 
the time it wastes. One example of this is the U.S. 
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) program of 
the 1990s. A large-scale randomized impact 
evaluation found this program to cause 
unemployed youths to wait longer to go to work 
than their counterparts in the experimental 
control group (Orr et al., 1996), possibly because 
they expected the program to deliver them an 
unrealistically attractive job, which did not 
happen.  
 This example illustrates how the assumption 
that control group members will be harmed by 
exclusion from an untested social program runs 
counter to a fundamental research paradigm in 
many fields—that when studying interventions to 
see what they affect, science should presume no 
impacts until proven otherwise. Peter Rossi’s “Iron 
Law of Evaluation” is that “the expected value of 
any net impact assessment of any large scale social 
program is zero” (1987, p.4). Further, given that 
the zinc law is “only those programs that are likely 
to fail are evaluated” (p.5), we would be smart to 
not start from the position that placement in the 
control group will put individuals or organizations 
behind where they would have been had they been 
assigned to receive program services. True, new 
ways of providing social assistance only get 
legislated, or put forward as demonstration tests, 
when someone believes they will be beneficial. 
Whether this is in fact the case is unknown and is 
the rationale for considering a rigorous 
experimental test of the intervention. It is 
unknown whether being in a randomized control 
group would cause harm, in the same way that it is 
unknown whether being in the treatment group 
would cause benefits. This uncertainty is the whole 
reason for conducting an experiment in the first 
place.2 Of course, one should not exclude a control 
																																																																																						
application costs—raised only to be denied services in 
the end. In this case different bases for arguing the 
ethical acceptability of random assignment must be 
found, such as those noted below. 
2 Notwithstanding this fact, a small group of individuals 
assigned to the control group in the National Job Corps 
Study (Schochet, et al., 2001) sued for having been 
harmed by exclusion from the treatment group and won 
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group from a beneficial intervention for research 
purposes a second time once proof of a benefit is 
in hand, nor keep them in the “untreated” 
condition should an ongoing experiment show 
benefits of a potentially life-altering magnitude.  
 A similar point applies to medical trials: early 
checks for effects on mortality and other extremely 
consequential outcomes are thought essential for 
ethical reasons, as is the imperative to stop 
withholding life-saving treatments from the 
control group once early impact findings indicate 
that lives can be saved or major negative health 
consequences averted. Randomized experimental 
tests of social policies with the potential for major 
benefits of this magnitude (if there are any) should 
always include collection, analysis, and reporting 
of early outcome data to ensure that control group 
members are not deprived of vital benefits any 
longer than is necessary to discover that those 
benefits exist. Believing in or hoping for any kind 
of benefit is not the same thing as proof. If harm as 
well as benefit could arise from an unproven 
intervention, a seemingly black and white ethical 
principle becomes ambiguous.  
 Third, it is possible that control group 
members will be disadvantaged but there is 
justification for why this might still be an ethical 
course to follow, as Blustein (2005) elaborates. 
Society, which benefits from accurate information 
about program and policy effectiveness, may be 
justified in allowing some individuals or 
organizations to be disadvantaged in order to 
gather that information and thereby achieve much 
wider benefits. Society regularly disadvantages 
individuals based on government policy decisions 
undertaken for non-research reasons, such as 
when free trade agreements cost some workers 
their jobs while creating jobs for others in export 
industries or when the opening of high-occupancy 
vehicle (HOV) lanes disadvantage solo commuters 
to the benefit of carpool groups. Moreover, unlike 
changes in other societal rules, the potential losses 
from assignment to a control group for research 
reasons are temporary—until the end of the study 
period—while the benefits of good information to 
society will be long-term. As in medical research, if 
major benefits of a treatment are quickly proven, 
then a social policy experiment should enroll 
control group members in the intervention 
without waiting for the study to run its originally 
planned course.  
																																																																																						
their case, providing some voice in an otherwise 
relatively silent debate about the ethics of random 
assignment in social policy evaluation (Blustein, 2005). 
 
 No researcher can appropriately weigh the 
balance of these considerations on society’s behalf 
when considering whether the broad use of 
randomized impact studies as a way to improve 
policy is justified. That is a decision that must fall 
to public officials. Still, on the basis of the above 
considerations, the question of the inherent 
fairness or lack of fairness of random assignment 
remains an open question not a firm impediment 
to the use of the method, with arguments to be 




We next explore five alleged scientific limitations 
of social experiments to gauge each concern’s 
validity and potential for remediation through 
effective research design. These criticisms arise 
from doing experiments in real-world conditions 
and may apply to evaluations of existing, ongoing 
programs and to evaluations of pilot tests of new 
interventions. Some of these concerns have 
explicitly arisen in the scholarly literature, which 
we cite, while others have not, meaning they are 
undocumented issues that have emerged from the 
authors’ own examination of possible scientific 






The first scientific criticism of randomized 
experiments that we wish to consider is the charge 
that they reveal only the impact of the “intention 
to treat”—called ITT impacts by Heckman et al. 
(2000)—rather than the impact of actually being 
treated—what Heckman et al. call the “impact of 
the treatment on the treated,” or the TOT impact. 
This ITT/TOT distinction arises whenever less 
than 100 percent of a randomly assigned 
treatment group participates in the assigned 
intervention—i.e., when the “treated” group is 
different (smaller) than the full experimental 
sample assigned to treatment. Less than 100 
percent participation of treatment group members 
is common in experimental evaluations: 
individuals cannot be compelled to take part in an 
intervention such as subsidized housing simply 
because they applied for it and were randomly 
selected to be offered admission. Applicants for 
government social programs regularly change their 
minds about participation before the admission 
decision comes, a result inevitable as well then for 
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some number of applicants chosen by random 
assignment.  
 On the one hand, the ITT estimate of the 
average effect of being assigned to receive 
treatment might be considered the most policy-
relevant measure of a program’s impact. 3  It 
reflects the target population’s overall response to 
the intervention—the combined consequences of 
(i) decisions to participate and (ii) impacts once 
participating—for the target group as a whole. 
Arguably, this is what policy-makers need to know 
in some contexts. The ITT estimate essentially 
averages impacts across those who took up the 
offer of treatment and those who did not; it 
represents what is likely to happen on average in 
the target population as a whole from future offers 
of the same intervention.  
 On the other hand, the TOT estimate tells 
policymakers the average impact of participating 
in the intervention for those members of the target 
population who choose to participate after 
receiving the offer. Impact information on this 
subset provides the best comparison to average 
spending for the intervention—cost per funded 
“slot”—for funders and is presumably what 
prospective participants want to know: how much 
they can expect to gain if they do participate. So 
TOT estimates are of interest to both policymakers 
and a broader population. Therefore one might 
wish that social experiments were capable of 
producing both types of impact estimates reliably, 
ITT and TOT. 
 One can calculate the ITT impact measure 
without bias in an experiment as the difference 
between the average outcome for all treatment 
group members (all of whom receive the 
intervention offer, though some do not take it up) 
and the average outcome for all control group 
members. Fortunately, the TOT estimate is also 
readily obtainable from the experimental data 
without bias, subject to an assumption. Applying 
what is known in the literature as the “no-show 
adjustment” converts any ITT estimate into the 
corresponding TOT estimate. Introduced by 
Bloom (1984), the no-show adjustment requires 
that the intervention has no effect on members of 
the treatment group who do not participate—for 
example, the students randomly assigned to a 
voluntary after-school program who never attend 
																																																								
3 This average effect can also be quite small and hence 
difficult to detect statistically, when only a small 
percentage of the treatment group receives the assigned 
intervention—a circumstance in which most individuals 
experience zero impact. We classify this as a feasibility 
issue rather than a scientific validity issue and consider 
it as Concern #10 below. 
the program. This assumption is, in our 
experience, viewed as innocuous by almost all 
observers—evaluators and policymakers—when 
voluntary participation interventions are 
examined and reliable data on participation can be 
obtained. 
 Based on this assumption, the initial measure 
of impact—the intervention’s average impact 
across all treatment group members in the ITT 
estimate—includes both potentially positive (or 
negative) effects on participants and zero effects 
on non-participants (the “no-shows”). Such an 
estimate can be rescaled to remove the diluting 
effect of non-participation, providing a measure of 
the average impact on just those who do 
participate. No assumptions regarding the 
similarity of participants and non-participants is 
needed, nor is the ability to adjust statistically for 
differences between the two groups; the 
participants and “no-shows” can be as different as 
night and day and the TOT estimate based on 
Bloom’s method remains unbiased as long as the 








In a decentralized, fragmented federalist system, 
the policies and services of one branch of the 
national government will often be supplied in 
similar if not identical form by other government 
or nonprofit agencies. That is, unlike in medical 
trials where a placebo is intended to represent 
nothing, a social experiments’ counterfactual is 
usually described as the “status quo” or as 
“business as usual.” Random assignment in social 
policy evaluations does not control whether 
individuals access similar alternative services; as a 
result, some control group members inevitably do 
so. This means that the control group is not a “no 
services” placebo in most social policy evaluations. 
This is the case, for example, when state pre-
kindergarten programs do substantially the same 
things for members of the same target group as the 
federal Head Start program and access to one or 
the other is randomized for research purposes. 
Increasingly, medical and policy evaluations alike 
are avoiding no-services control groups and 
instead testing the relative effects of contrasting 
treatments. 
 The circumstance of evaluating a program 
relative to everything else that exists in the 
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community gives randomized impact studies the 
same character as the real-world programs they 
seek to evaluate. As such, this is a strength, rather 
than a weakness, of the experimental approach as 
long as the nature of usual services if fully 
documented. Some of the people who apply to the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) Head Start program would obtain similar 
assistance from other state sources were DHHS’s 
intervention not available. When precisely this 
event occurs for some of the children assigned to 
the control group in the Head Start Impact Study 
(Puma et al., 2005) it is a good thing, from the 
standpoint of understanding Head Start’s 
contribution to improving on what services are 
otherwise available in the community. It is 
precisely the choice between the experiment’s two 
scenarios—a set of children enrolled in Head Start 
(the treatment group), or a subset of the same 
children served by state pre-kindergarten 
programs (represented by the control group)—that 
DHHS controls when implementing its Head Start 
program. If Head Start were not there, services to 
some of the children it serves would still take place 
from other sources.  
 DHHS should not seek to impose any stronger 
contrasts between the intervention and control 
group children when measuring that program’s 
impact. Knowing how a given intervention 
compares to no intervention at all does not help 
social decision-making in a fragmented federalist 
system with many intervention sponsors and 
selective consumer participation among available 
programs. Looking at “our services” compared to 
“everything else that’s out there” is exactly what 
DHHS should be doing to justify its program and 
policy portfolio, because if everything else that is 
out there is enough, then the money spent on 
DHHS programs could be cut back without 
consequence. The same is true for other programs 







This concern—which we have noted in previous 
unpublished work of our own but have not seen 
previously in the literature—arises from the 
possibility of “queuing effects” among control 
group members. The existence of the intervention 
under study may shorten the queue for control 
group members seeking to access alternative 
services, compared to the competition for those 
services they would have faced if the studied 
program did not exist. Because treatment group 
members (and other, non-research individuals) 
participate in the program under study, they do 
not contend with control group members for 
access to outside services, as would happen in the 
world the control group is supposed to represent—
a world in which the studied program does not 
exist. With competition for similar services from 
other sources less fierce than it would be in a true 
counterfactual world, control group members get 
too much help from other sources. 
 To see more clearly how this could happen, 
consider the example of job training provided by 
programs funded by the U.S. Department of Labor 
(DOL) and programs sponsored by other agencies. 
As a thought experiment suppose one of these 
programs, DOL’s Workforce Innovation and 
Opportunity Act (WIOA) program, was completely 
eliminated. In this scenario, the total supply of 
employment and training services in the nation 
would fall precipitously. Everyone seeking 
employment and training assistance, including 
those ordinarily served by WIOA, would have to 
scramble for the available services “slots.” But 
because in an actual social experiment WIOA 
would not go away, control group members from 
such a study would not have to scramble in this 
way with such a larger group of other training-
seekers. In turn, more of them would find “slots,” 
potentially altering treatment/control differences 
in outcomes and producing an undersestimate of 
WIOA’s impact.  
 If Congress were deciding between continuing 
versus eliminating WIOA, one would want to run a 
social experiment in which (1) treatment group 
members are given access to WIOA, and (2) 
control group members compete for access to 
training services from non-WIOA sources, but do 
so in a “market” in which treatment group 
members are also vying for those alternative 
training slots. Unfortunately, the second condition 
cannot be met: the treatment group cannot 
simultaneously participate in the WIOA program 
that still exists and jostle with the control group 
for access to the limited number of alternative 
service sources, sometimes squeezing them out of 
those slots.  
 This critique hinges on two unstated 
assumptions: that evaluation results will guide a 
decision to either keep WIOA at its current scale or 
eliminate it altogether, and that other programs 
providing similar services to the same customer 
group would not expand their scale were WIOA 
eliminated. If Congress were choosing between 
full-scale WIOA and no WIOA and did not expect 
the “hole” WIOA would leave if discontinued to be 
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filled by other employment and training programs, 
we would indeed want control group members to 
have to compete with treatment group members 
for other, non-WIOA training slots to achieve the 
appropriate counterfactual for the policy choice at 
hand. But if Congress expects other funders to 
expand services in response to the “shortages” 
created by WIOA’s disappearance, then expanded 
service availability for the control group—up to a 
point—represents the correct counterfactual.  
 A similar point holds when deciding whether 
to expand or contract WIOA funding at the 
margin. Such a change would affect only a small 
share of all those seeking WIOA-type services. In 
this circumstance, what happens to control group 
members will represent the desired option and 
outcomes well—they really would not have to 
compete with many more workers for training 
slots when the WIOA program size changes only 
fractionally. Therefore, the contrast produced by 
the treatment-control comparison in the actual 
experiment would reasonably trace the 
consequences of the considered policy decision.  
 With most evaluations of existing programs 
likely to influence funding and scale at the margin 
rather than in an “all or nothing” way, and with the 
potential for at least partially offsetting 
adjustments in the scale of alternative services in a 
fragmented federal system, randomized 
experiments with full access to alternative services 
among control group members seems a better 
approximation to the desired evaluation 
counterfactual than experiments with no control 
group access to those services. Neither is perfect, 
but in principle the perfect version of control 
group experiences is unknowable until policies 
actually change—either marginally or 
dramatically—and other agencies react—either a 
little or a lot. Absent that information, a cautious 
approach appropriate to marginal changes and the 
approach that social experiments naturally 
produce in our judgment provides the safer basis 






Another similar, but possibly minor, problem of 
randomized impact studies arises on the treatment 
group side for interventions with a fixed number of 
service slots when some of the people or 
organizations that would ordinarily occupy those 
slots are placed in a control group. Removing a 
portion of the normally-served population 
necessarily results in one of two changes to an 
existing program’s operations: either it serves 
fewer people, operating below capacity (or, if 
below capacity anyway, operating even further 
below capacity than usual) or it serves additional 
people who ordinarily would not be served due to 
capacity constraints. There is no way around this 
issue—if one artificially pulls out some would-be 
participants, one necessarily leaves the program 
short (or shorter than usual) of participants or 
brings in others who normally would not 
participate.  
 The question is whether either of these results 
matters to the size of the program impacts 
measured compared to the quantity one wants to 
measure via random assignment? Likely both 
results do matter, though perhaps not to a very 
great extent. A program with added vacancies 
created by random assignment may deliver 
services differently for the customers it does serve. 
If budgets remain unchanged, then the typical 
participant in a less fully-subscribed program 
presumably receives more services and hence may 
experience a larger impact. Or smaller numbers of 
participants may change the dynamics of group 
elements of the intervention that depend on how 
many participants interact in the service delivery 
setting (e.g., class size in educational 
interventions), either increasing or possibly 
diminishing impacts on those who participate as 
part of unnaturally small groups.  
 Alternatively, program scale and operations 
could remain unchanged if added people are 
served who normally would be closed out due to 
capacity limits. These are clients of lower priority 
in the program’s view, or clients with less 
motivation or ability to ensure that they make the 
first cut. They may even be people who would not 
have applied to participate, if the program has to 
expand its recruiting to supply enough applicants 
for a control group and remain fully subscribed.4 
In a normal year, when random exclusions are not 
imposed on those “ahead of them in line” for the 
sake of the research, they would not be served. 
Unless a lottery of some sort is ordinarily used to 
ration slots among a surplus set of applicants, the 
usual means of obtaining access creates 
distinctions between those who get in and those 
who do not—one of the very problems that 
experiments are used to overcome. It may be that 
the applicants thought most in need of help receive 
priority or that those expected to benefit most 
																																																								
4 An added recruitment effort itself might change how 
the program does other things, including the nature and 
effectiveness of the services it delivers to treatment 
group members. This would be another distorting effect 
of running an experiment. 
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from the program’s services (which might or might 
not be the same people) do. On one factor or 
another, entrants differ from non-admitted 
applicants and the resulting differences could lead 
to larger or smaller program impacts. The 
intervention (treatment) and counterfactual 
(control) samples continue to match one another, 
through random assignment, but collectively they 
represent the wrong set of people, a somewhat 
different and larger set than would ordinarily be 
served.   
 Fortunately, Olsen, Bell and Nichols (2016) 
propose a way to identify which individuals would 
ordinarily have been served so that impact results 
can be produced for just that subset. Under their 
approach, local program operators are given the 
opportunity to identify applicants they would 
enroll in a normal year (i.e., a year without a 
randomized admissions lottery). Their incentive to 
do so reliably results from another design twist: 
increasing the probability of being assigned to the 
treatment group for “normal year” enrollees, 
something program managers presumably would 
desire (since these are the applicants they would 
choose to admit first in a normal year). This set of 
participants and their control group counterparts 
can be analyzed as a subgroup defined by pre-
random assignment information (normal-year 
enrollee/normal year non-enrollee status) and the 
study can obtain impact estimates for the 
normally-served population.5  
 No good data exist on how much this would 
matter to the size of impacts measured from the 
experimental data. What we do know is that both 
these problems—artificial shortfalls in enrollment 
and different-than-usual participant populations—
diminish as the control group shrinks in size 
relative to the program’s capacity. When control 
group members are spread over many local 
programs, with only one or two individual control 
group cases in any community, no program can be 
pushed much below its regular scale or forced to 
serve very many new customers by the removal 
(into control status) of some people it normally 
would serve. The National Job Corps Study 
provides an excellent example of steering clear of 
distortions to the treatment group by this means—
making very few control group exclusions in any 
one program site—while still achieving a large 
overall control group sample through inclusion of 
																																																								
5 A bonus of the Olsen, Bell and Nichols (2016) method 
arises from the normal year non-enrollee subgroup 
included in the experiment. Analyzed separately, this 
population yields an estimate of the effect of program 
expansion on the marginal enrollees, something often of 
great importance to funding expansion decisions. 
many sites (Schochet et al., 2001). This model 








The final scientific objection we consider is that 
experiments eliminate selection bias in measuring 
the effect of services provided from the point of 
random assignment forward but do not provide 
equally strong information on the consequences of 
services provided at other stages of the intake and 
in-program service delivery processes. 
Experiments instead leave evaluators with nothing 
to turn to answer other policy questions besides 
less reliable non-experimental comparisons. For 
example, consider the relative impact of varying 
sequences or “dosages” of services determined 
after randomization (and never observed for the 
control group). One might like to examine how 
much difference these program elements make to 
program success; but, without randomizing, these 
in-program participation patterns are endogenous, 
and the analysis of their effects are likely to suffer 
from selection bias. Conversely, an experiment 
cannot show directly how much difference 
interaction with the program prior to random 
assignment might have made to participant 
outcomes, since these effects occur for both 
treatment and control group members.  
 This discussion emphasizes the importance of 
choosing wisely when deciding where to position 
random assignment within a program’s intake 
flow. Does this issue point out a weakness of 
experimental designs compared to other impact 
analysis strategies that yield estimates of the 
effects of multiple program features? No: 
researchers using experimental data have all the 
same options available for non-experimental 
analyses of impacts of program components as 
non-experimental studies (think of simply “setting 
aside the control group data”). Moreover, 
techniques exist that capitalize on the 
experimental design when defining and analyzing 
subgroups defined by post-random assignment 
events, choices or program features (e.g., Peck, 
2013, 2015).6 
																																																								
6 These analytic techniques (see for example Peck, 2003, 
2005, 2007, 2013, 2015; Bell & Peck, 2013; Harvill, 
Peck, & Bell, 2013) reduce the seriousness of concern #6 
by providing opportunities to explore questions of 
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 In sum, at the place where randomization is 
inserted in a social experiment the research gets 
stronger. Everywhere else it remains the same. 
Eliminating one selection bias problem—the one 
that distorts the answer to the most important 
policy question to be addressed by a study—is 
clearly a virtue of experiments compared to 
eliminating none. Moreover, random assignment 
at more than one point in the intake and service 
delivery flow will give strong experimental answers 





Beginning with the alleged ethical and scientific 
failings of randomized experiments, we have 
argued that these concerns are not the terminus 
for experiments but instead issues on which to 
focus in building stronger impact evaluations. The 
next step would seem straightforward—“Just do 
them”—but it is not. Feasibility issues also demand 
consideration. Can a scientifically valid, ethically 
acceptable research approach actually be pulled off 
reliably under real-world conditions? Our 
conclusion in this realm is that eight feasibility 
concerns can be overcome by devoting sufficient 
resources to sizing and conducting an 
experimental evaluation, if the policy question to 
be addressed is of sufficient importance. Naturally, 
the policy questions of insufficient importance to 
address one or more feasibility issue through more 
spending should not be studied with experimental 
methods (see discussion of funding tradeoffs at 






Evaluations of systems change and other 
community-wide “saturation” interventions are 
almost universally evaluated using non-
experimental methods (e.g., Connell, Kubish, 
Schorr, & Weiss, 1998; Fulbright-Anderson, 
Kubish, & Connell, 2002; Nichols, 2013). The one 
known exception (Bloom et al., 2005) randomized 
a small number of comparatively small 
																																																																																						
dosage or varying treatment paths within the 
experimental design. For a recent applied example, see 
Peck and Bell’s (2014) analysis of the role of quality in 
children’s Head Start experiences, or Moulton, Peck & 
Dillman’s (2014) analysis of the role of neighborhood 
quality in the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) 
demonstration. 
communities, 15 public housing developments in 
six cities. While it has become common to 
randomize clusters of study subjects instead of 
individual units—for example, clusters of students 
and/or classrooms (i.e., full schools) in 
educational evaluations (Jacob, Zhu & Bloom, 
2009) or clusters of patients or physicians (i.e., 
clinics) in health policy evaluations (Meurer & 
Lewis, 2015)—these are not communities in a 
geographic sense.  
 We consider evaluations of community-wide 
interventions to be prime candidates for 
application of the experimental method, if the 
policy questions to be addressed are sufficiently 
important to justify the resources required. The 
U.S. is a very large nation, with tens of thousands 
of local communities or neighborhoods that could 
be randomly assigned into or out of a particular 
community-level policy or intervention. Likewise, 
the world is large, with many places, both within 
and across countries, eligible to be the subject of 
place-based policy evaluation. There is no 
feasibility constraint to randomizing across many 
places, only a willingness constraint—one that 
society can overcome if sufficient importance 
attaches to the policy question posed.  
 Community-wide saturation interventions 
make data collection more difficult and expensive, 
and any impacts that do occur harder to find 
because they tend to be diffused across many 
people in the community. These drawbacks afflict 
any impact evaluation research on saturation 
interventions, not just experiments. Therefore, the 
simple fact that an intervention involves 
community saturation is not a sufficient argument 
in our judgment to dismiss using an experimental 









Concern about meeting the sample size 
requirements of experimentally-designed 
evaluations understandably arises in situations 
where programs are already struggling to meet 
their enrollment targets. How can such programs 
allocate a large number of eligible applicants to an 
unserved control group and still fill up all of their 
funded service “slots”? One possibility is that 
programs in this situation are not sufficiently in 
demand in their communities to warrant their 
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current level of funding and therefore should have 
their funding reduced at the margin, at which 
point an experimental evaluation is no longer 
infeasible. However, it may be important to have 
information on program effectiveness before 
funding reductions are considered. In that case, 
only a small number of control group cases needs 
to be sampled in any locality compared to the size 
of the overall program in that community. As long 
as enough localities can be included in the study, 
this will still provide adequate sample sizes for the 
evaluation. The Head Start Impact Study took this 
approach, requiring only 11 control group 
members per Head Start center to be included in 
the evaluation—centers that typically served 100 
or more children—while including over 300 
centers in the study (Puma et al., 2005).  
 In some instances, additional technical 
assistance resources may be needed to increase the 
flow of applicants sufficiently to accommodate a 
modest-sized control group without leaving 
funded slots unused. However, this raises the 
possibility of a compositional shift in the 
population served discussed in conjunction with 







Some policy innovations seek to alter citizens’ or 
firms’ decisions in areas typically considered 
under long time horizons where long-term 
planning guides behavior, such as decisions to 
return to work in the face of permanent disability 
or to invest in a new production plant capacity. We 
would not expect policies intended to affect long-
run behavior to reveal their full impact in an 
experimental setting unless the treatment group 
members in the study believe the policy will apply 
to them forever (or at least for many, many years) 
and the control group members believe the policy 
will never apply to them. The concern here is that 
these are unrealistic conditions to impose when 
testing a new policy intervention—i.e., that a 
demonstration project cannot create a credible 
sense of permanency for either group: control 
group members may come to expect their “turn” to 
get the new intervention and behave in a way that 
anticipates the policy applying to them later on, 
and treatment group members will know that the 
demonstration is a test of something that may be 
withdrawn.  
 In response to this concern, we make two 
points. First, government’s treatment of its citizens 
and businesses changes all the time, making 
uncertainty about how long current policies will 
continue the right context for observing behavior 
under different current “rules.” Second, policy 
conditions for treatment and control group 
members in an evaluation do not have to be 
unnaturally abbreviated simply because they are 
assigned at random. Control group “embargoes” 
from the tested intervention need not be time-
limited unless ethical concerns become too 
extreme, and treatment group interventions can be 
offered and funded for a lifetime if that aspect of 
the tested policy is sufficiently important to its 
success.  
 One example is the provision of alternative 
disability benefits to individuals whose medical 
conditions are not expected to improve. Changes 
in benefit rules designed to encourage work may 
have no effect, or less than their full effect, unless 
treatment group members believe these changes 
will apply to them over their entire lifetimes. We 
do not see this as an obstacle to accurate 
experimental findings: it simply means that 
adequate funding needs to be committed to pay for 
lifetime changes to benefit rules for treatment 
group members that extend over their entire 
lifetimes. If initial findings of positive effects—
given the long-run planning decisions of treatment 
group members—are sufficiently encouraging, 
then the intervention can be applied to the control 
group within their lifetimes; what matters in this 
case is that during the interval in which the impact 
assessment takes place, control group members 
were not expecting to ever receive the new 
services, and treatment group members were 










The discussion here extends consideration of the 
ramifications of less than 100 percent 
participation begun at Concern #2 above. There, 
the issue was whether incomplete participation 
results in experimental impact analysis answering 
the wrong policy question. Here, the policy 
question is presumed to be on target but concern 
arises about a study’s ability to detect non-zero 
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impacts of policy importance as statistically 
significant. The simple fact is that small average 
effects can be detected in sufficiently large 
samples. The cost of the larger samples is justified 
if the anticipated impact (i) would be of great 
policy importance even if small on average, or (ii) 
becomes large enough to hold great policy 
importance once translated into the effect of the 








It is common for government agencies 
commissioning policy evaluations to ask 
researchers to tell them whether a program has its 
desired impact overall and, if so, to determine 
which features of the program account for its 
effectiveness. This second category of information 
allows funders to make interventions more cost-
effective by increasing the effective components 
and/or eliminating components that do not add to 
impacts. The up/down nature of experimental 
findings concerning the entire package of 
intervention components under study is thought to 
severely limit the usefulness of social experiments 
as a way to discover how a program can be made 
more effective or less costly through changes in the 
intervention elements. 
 One response to this criticism of evaluations 
that use random assignment is obvious: randomize 
more things, including the components of 
intervention packages or different variants of an 
overall intervention approach. Recent examples 
such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services’ evaluation of a health sector career 
pathways-based training program (the Health 
Profession Opportunity Grant [HPOG] program), 
includes randomization to two treatment arms and 
a control group, where the treatment arms include 
the basic HPOG intervention and an enhanced 
version of the intervention. This allows 
determining the extent to which the added 
features of the enhancement are important to 
improving on the control condition.  
 While “multi-arm” random assignment is 
unusual in recent social experiments (another 
example is the National Evaluation of Welfare to 
Work Strategies) it need not stay that way. Indeed 
“early social experiments were much more 
ambitious” in randomizing to multiple variants of 
an intervention (Bloom, 1995, p.18), with the 
Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments of the 
1970s, for example, randomly assigning families to 
as many as 58 distinct policy options by varying 
tax rates and guarantee levels to ascertain people’s 
responses (Greenberg and Robins, 1986). While 
this approach may sacrifice statistical precision if 
not sufficiently powered (i.e., if fewer people are 
assigned to any one policy option), these examples 
highlight that lack of applicability to the question 
of “what works best” is not an inherent limitation 
of randomized experiments. Recent scholarship 
has highlighted many design opportunities that 
can help answer these more nuanced questions 
(Peck, 2016a). 
 Moreover, multi-stage random assignment 
can be used to answer questions about the effects 
of different treatment experiences without 
sacrificing statistical precision (Bell & Peck, 2016). 
For example, suppose a government agency 
wanted to know if a work incentive would increase 
employment among people receiving public 
income support benefits, and whether the impact 
of such incentives on employment success and 
self-sufficiency would be increased by providing 
those induced by the incentives to go to work with 
additional job supports such as transportation 
subsidies and case worker interdiction when on-
the-job problems arise.  
 Rather than randomize the target population 
into three groups at the outset—one treatment 
group receiving the new work incentive, another 
treatment group receiving the new work incentive 
plus added job supports, and a control group—
thereby cutting the size of each group by one-third 
relative to two-arm random assignment—an 
innovative design would randomize at two 
different points in time: two-way randomization of 
the full sample to determine which individuals 
receive the new work incentive, followed by—for 
individuals in the incentivized group who obtain 
jobs—separate two-way randomization to the 
provision or non-provision of the added job 
supports. This design not only increases the 
statistical precision of the impact estimates for a 
given total sample size by using some sample 
members for multiple purposes (e.g., the 
incentivized workers who do not obtain jobs serve 
to represent outcomes under an incentives-only 
policy and an incentives-plus-job-supports policy), 
it concentrates the examination of the impact of 
job supports on just individuals who, if given the 
opportunity, actually use them—making 
statistically detectable impacts more likely.  
 We further elaborate on these points about 
creativity and flexibility in randomized 
experimental designs in Bell and Peck (2016). In 
addition to randomizing across multiple treatment 
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models or using multi-stage randomization to 
capture varying impacts in multi-faceted 
interventions, the analytic approaches described in 
response to Concern #6 above apply here as well. 
These methods capitalize on the strengths of a 
randomized design while adding minimally 
intrusive assumptions (and sensitivity tests 
thereof). By these means, one can learn which 
components matter, without further 
randomization among various treatment regimes. 
The criticism that social experiments cannot “look 
inside the black box” to determine which elements 
of an intervention generate its success ignores 
design and analysis alternatives capable of 
revealing which components of multi-faceted 
interventions lead to their success. For further 
elaboration of “black box” opening designs and 
analyses, see the recent special section on this 
topic, published in the American Journal of 
Evaluation volume 36, issue 4 (2015) and large 
portions of issue 152 of New Directions in 








In an interconnected world, some consequences of 
social policies inevitably spill over to individuals 
not directly engaged in the program or services 
offered. This happens, for example, if job training 
equips workers to take jobs other workers would 
otherwise have held, resulting in earnings losses 
for workers not included in the research. 
Economists call this kind of situation a “general 
equilibrium effect” because it ripples through the 
social or economic system creating impacts in 
secondary locations not covered by the direct 
research sample. Smith (2002) provides several 
good examples of these general equilibrium effects 
of labor market interventions and explores the 
evaluation challenges they create. 
 Not only randomized experiments but all 
research based exclusively on data for individuals 
participating in an intervention and a confined 
sample of non-participants, such as an 
experimental control group, faces this issue—
spillover outside the study group. Randomization 
does not make these spillover effects more difficult 
to measure. The wider “ripple effects” of social 
policy initiatives confronted by general 
equilibrium analyses are always difficult and 
potentially expensive to measure, no more so for 








The appeal of randomized trials centers on their 
“internal validity”—i.e., their ability to provide 
unbiased information concerning impacts on the 
people or organizations directly studied and hence 
internal to the study sample. Policymakers also 
care about the “external validity” of  evaluations—
i.e., whether study findings are accurate for some 
larger external universe of interest, such as all 
homeless families in America or all minority-
owned small businesses. Researchers have argued 
that social experiments that are not specifically 
designed to provide external validity may give bad 
policy guidance for the pertinent population even 
when they provide very accurate evidence on 
impacts within the study sample (Olsen et al., 
2013). 
 At least a half-dozen experimental impact 
evaluations of ongoing social programs have 
achieved both internal and external validity, the 
latter by being conducted in geographically-based 
probability samples of the nation (without 
substantial attrition of local programs from the 
research) that formally represent all Americans. 
The Food Stamp Employment and Training 
Evaluation (Puma et al., 1990) is one example, the 
Head Start Impact Study (Puma et al., 2005) 
another. But what about social experiments that 
do not have external validity—are they still worth 
doing and to be preferred to non-experimental 
impact evaluations with external validity but 
that—due to selection bias—lack internal validity? 
Scholars have debated the internal versus external 
validity tradeoff since these two terms were 
invented (e.g., Bracht & Glass, 1986; Jimenez-
Buedo & Miller, 2010), with a general consensus 
preferencing internal to external validity 
(Reichardt, 2011)—and hence favoring 
experiments. But this does not put external 
validity out of reach of social experiments, as 
emphasized in recent work (e.g., Bell & Stuart, 
2016; Olsen & Orr, 2016; Tipton et al., 2014; 




Some critics posit that policy decisions in which 
results are needed quickly—without a multi-year 
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lag to set up and conduct random assignment and 
wait for medium- and long-term outcomes to 
emerge—cannot rely on experiments to inform 
them (e.g., Besharov, 2009). This is not a point 
unique to experiments: if policymakers are 
interested in long-term outcomes and impacts—or 
in interventions that themselves take a long time 
to administer—then any prospective evaluation 
design will require the time needed to cover the 
policy-relevant follow-up period. As a challenge to 
experiments in particular there is a potential 
response. Government agencies have the option of 
establishing a system of regular and temporally-
overlapping experimental evaluations of ongoing 
programs so that new information is always 
emerging from experimental data.  
 In addition, evaluations of shorter-term 
impacts need not take “too long.” As Peck and 
Scott (2005) showed, a small, government 
intervention with six-month follow-up took little 
more than six months to complete, informing 
policy decisions about modifying and expanding 
the studied innovation in a timely manner. 
Further, Ludwig, Kling and Mullainathan (2011) 
urge changing the outcomes of interest in 
experimental research to focus on the shorter-term 
mechanisms by which interventions have their 
effects, rather than the long term impacts that 






The eight feasibility concerns raised in the 
previous section can generally be overcome with 
political will, sufficient funding, and competent 
evaluation management. That said, the financial 
costs of experiments to those sponsoring the 
research (and therefore indirectly to taxpayers or 
foundation donors) have often been put forth as an 
important obstacle to use of experimental designs. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to investigate 
the costs of alternative impact evaluation designs 
in any detail. Suffice it to say that budgetary 
constraints on funding agencies—be they 
government, foundation or nonprofit—are not 
valid reasons to avoid experiments, especially in 
an era of heightened fiscal accountability and 
results-focused policy decision-making. 
 This is especially clear when one recognizes 
that the appropriate basis for choosing among 
competing research techniques is the marginal 
cost of experiments compared to other equally 
ambitious research studies that tackle the same set 
of policy questions. Obtaining broadly 
representative data on social program outcomes 
for thousands and thousands of people, both with 
and without a policy in place, is never inexpensive 
unless the data come from administrative records 
routinely compiled for program management 
reasons such as state Unemployment Insurance 
wage records or homeless shelter occupancy 
rosters. Whether the critical data come from 
existing research or new surveys, this facet of 
research cost is invariant to how program 
participants and non-participants are selected.  
 Data for non-experimental impact analyses 
can also be taken from large surveys of households 
and workers collected for purposes apart from 
impact evaluations of specific programs, such as 
the Current Population Survey and the Survey of 
Program Dynamics. Were such evaluations reliable 
sources of policy guidance, the fact that the social 
costs of data collection have already been paid 
would allow individual federal agencies to use the 
information at low marginal cost. However, 
national surveys combined with non-experimental 
analytic approaches was the first strategy for 
measuring the impacts of social programs non-
experimentally discredited by careful 
methodological research in the 1980s (Barnow, 
1987; LaLonde, 1986).  
 Small local reforms can also be examined 
experimentally using low-cost data. Researchers 
have argued that such reforms can provide an 
ideal testing ground for incremental changes 
useful for refining policies and programs and 
subsequently improving their performance. For 
example, Peck and Scott (2005) document one 
state’s efforts to change its public assistance intake 
process by this means. Not a major reform, the 
initiative used an experimental design to ascertain 
the extent to which welfare recipients were better 
off (in terms of their employment outcomes) when 
case workers used a more detailed intake 
assessment than they had previously been using. 
State program managers and analysts designed 
and implemented the intervention and provided 
data on treatment and control group cases’ 
characteristics and outcomes, and university 
researchers analyzed the data to determine short-
term impacts. The costs of this pilot test were 
minor and the learning likely more definitive than 
it would have been were the state to simply have 
compared outcomes before and after a change in 
procedures. That is to say, not all social 
experiments are or need to be large national policy 
reforms. The Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy 
(2007), its then president (Baron, 2012), and more 
recent efforts by the Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation (2015) all reinforce the point that 
experimental evaluations need not be costly. 
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 On a larger scale, society must consider the 
“opportunity costs” of failing to do experiments—
i.e., the money spent on ineffective programs that 
continue to be funded (and continue to offer false 
hope) because unbiased information on their 
inadequate impacts has not been produced. From 
this perspective, experiments may be the 
comparatively low cost option compared to other 
impact evaluation approaches once an 
appropriately broad social viewpoint is adopted 
(e.g., Burtless & Orr, 1986; Orr, 1999). 
 Importantly, prominent researchers known for 
their contributions to non-experimental impact 
evaluation methods have taken similar stances. 
Smith (2002), for example, writes: “Random 
assignment does have its costs, as it typically 
requires substantial staff training, ongoing staff 
monitoring and information provision to the 
potential participants… At the same time…this 
case can be overstated” (p. 21).  
 Greenberg and Shroder (2004), in the Digest 
of Social Experiments, provide an important 
closing perspective on the cost issue: “Sponsoring 
a social experiment requires complex resource 
allocation decisions. The social experiments 
conducted to date were authorized by many 
different [individuals] representing a wide 
spectrum of political views… It is striking that 
many very different individuals decided that this 
type of investigation is worth its costs” (p.13). It 
would be difficult for today’s national government 
to back away from the practice of rigorous, 
experimental impact evaluation on the grounds of 
insufficient funds, when reliable policy guidance is 
known to depend on the use of randomized 




In addition to the 15 concerns about social 
experiments just discussed, other scientific and 
practical limitations face all large-scale policy 
impact evaluations of any design, experimental or 
non-experimental. These issues include 
incomplete data, limited sample sizes (especially 
when looking at effects on subgroups), inability to 
sort out causes of cross-site variation, and lack of 
assured reliability for national policy making when 
study sites are not nationally representative. Much 
has been made about these shortcomings in the 
literature questioning the appropriateness of 
experiments, often without acknowledgement that 
they are not unique to experiments. In fact, 
naturally occurring populations, one with and one 
without policy exposure, can be and often are 
studied using non-experimental methods (i) in 
non-representative locations, (ii) with incomplete 
data and (iii) little capability to sort out which 
subgroups benefit more or (iv) what accounts for 
variation in apparent impacts across subgroups 
and locales. 
 Another criticism of social experiments 
concerns incorrect analysis of nested or 
hierarchical data, if the analytic method is not 
aligned to the level of the hierarchy at which 
randomization occurs. Research on education 
reform provides one example: entire schools 
randomized in and out of the treatment but impact 
analysis that produces reliable findings only if 
individual students are randomized (e.g., Bickman 
& Reich, 2009; Henry, 2009). We do not list this 
as a challenge for randomized evaluation designs 
to overcome because it is simply a problem of 
inappropriate analysis methods in what should be 
highly reliable, non-problematic social 
experiments. As the science of accurately analyzing 
nested data in an experimental context becomes 
more widespread (see for example Bloom, 2005, 
for an important contribution), we expect this 




The purposes of this article are to identify some 
perceived limitations of experimental designs 
when researching social program impacts—
whether those limitations arise from past 
publications or practice—and to explore the extent 
to which these concerns preclude the use of 
experiments in a range of social policy evaluation 
contexts. In terms of the primary ethical criticism, 
we argue that an equal-opportunity lottery is the 
fairest way to ration access to supply-limited social 
services. Running such a lottery for research 
purposes is justified even in situations without 
supply constraints, when society does not know 
whether the “lottery winners” will fare better than 
the “losers” yet having that information is vital to 
making programmatic and funding decisions to 
help disadvantaged citizens going forward. The 
several scientific objections that have been raised 
about social experiments also appear to us 
unfounded or minor relative to the strength of the 
randomized evaluation approach and its potential 
to inform policy decisions about program 
effectiveness. The many feasibility obstacles to 
experiments on closer inspection appear to be only 
“speed bumps” that do not block the road toward 
greater use of social experimentation and can be 
overcome with adequate funding. Finally, we 
conclude that the reluctance to bear the perceived 
higher cost of social experiments compared to 
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impact evaluations with non-experimental designs 
is short-sighted given that the cost of not knowing 
about a program’s causal effects may be potentially 
much greater than the cost of finding out. 
 We hope this discussion of potential pitfalls in 
social experimentation is useful to those in the 
government and foundation sectors planning 
future evaluation activity. We also hope that some 
of the factors thought to be obstacles to using 
social experiments receive greater debate in the 
literature and other forums beyond this article, 
and perhaps as a result come to be seen more 
clearly. A reassessment of the strengths and 
limitations of randomized experiments seems 
particularly appropriate at this juncture in light of 
recent advances in experimental evaluation design 
and analysis that have strengthened the ability of 
experiments to address historical concerns in ways 
cited in this article.  
 To recap our thesis: Are experiments 
sufficiently robust to serve as the customary 
standard of practice in social program impact 
evaluation? Operationally and scientifically, we 
believe they are, particularly if the political will 
and funding commitment exist to carry them out 
properly. Should and will they be used more 
extensively? That depends in large measure on 
their costs compared to the costs of alternative 
research strategies—a topic that deserves more 
careful inspection. In the meantime, the argument 
of this article is that issues of ethics, scientific 
integrity, and practical feasibility need not stand in 
the way of expanded use of social experiments for 
measuring policy and program impacts. The 
commonly cited objections and limitations are, on 
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